A superconducting transition temperature as high as 100 K was recently discovered in one monolayer FeSe grown on SrTiO3. The discovery ignited efforts to identify the mechanism for the markedly enhanced Tc from its bulk value of 8 K. There are two main views about the origin of the Tc enhancement: interfacial effects and/or excess electrons with strong electron correlation. Here, we report the observation of superconductivity below 20 K in surface electron-doped bulk FeSe. The doped surface layer possesses all (...) the key spectroscopic aspects of the monolayer FeSe on SrTiO3. Without interfacial effects, the surface layer state has a moderate Tc of 20 K with a smaller gap opening of 4.2 meV. Our results show that excess electrons with strong correlation cannot induce the maximum Tc, which in turn reveals the need for interfacial effects to achieve the highest Tc in one monolayer FeSe on SrTiO3. (shrink)

This paper brings to light a new puzzle for Frege interpretation, and offers a solution to that puzzle. The puzzle concerns Frege’s judgement-stroke (‘|’), and consists in a tension between three of Frege’s claims. First, Frege vehemently maintains that psychological considerations should have no place in logic. Second, Frege regards the judgementstroke—and the associated dissociation of assertoric force from content, of the act of judgement from the subject matter about which judgement is made—as a crucial part of his logic. Third, (...) Frege holds that judging is an inner mental process, and that the distinction marked by the judgement-stroke, between entertaining a thought and judging that it is true, is a psychological distinction. I argue that what initially looks like confusion here on Frege’s part appears quite reasonable when we remind ourselves of the differences between Frege’s conception of logic and our own. (shrink)

In this note I raise a new problem for backwards time travel, and make some first suggestions as to how it might be solved. I call it the motivation problem. It is not a logical or a metaphysical problem, but a psychological one. It does not impact upon the possibility, or even the likelihood, of backwards time travel. Yet it is deeply puzzling, and we will have no idea what time travel would actually be like until we explore it. Thus, (...) where other problems for backward time travel assume that we know what time travel would be like, and argue that we cannot have it, this new problem gives us no reason to think that we cannot have time travel, but argues that we have much less idea than we usually suppose about what it would really be like to travel back in time. (shrink)

A many-valued (aka multiple- or multi-valued) semantics, in the strict sense, is one which employs more than two truth values; in the loose sense it is one which countenances more than two truth statuses. So if, for example, we say that there are only two truth values—True and False—but allow that as well as possessing the value True and possessing the value False, propositions may also have a third truth status—possessing neither truth value—then we have a many-valued semantics in the (...) loose but not the strict sense. A many-valued logic is one which arises from a many-valued semantics and does not also arise from any two-valued semantics [Malinowski, 1993, 30]. By a ‘logic’ here we mean either a set of tautologies, or a consequence relation. We can best explain these ideas by considering the case of classical propositional logic. The language contains the usual basic symbols (propositional constants p, q, r, . . .; connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔; and parentheses) and well-formed formulas are defined in the standard way. With the language thus specified—as a set of well-formed formulas—its semantics is then given in three parts. (i) A model of a logical language consists in a free assignment of semantic values to basic items of the non-logical vocabulary. Here the basic items of the non-logical vocabulary are the propositional constants. The appropriate kind of semantic value for a proposition is a truth value, and so a model of the language consists in a free assignment of truth values to basic propositions. Two truth values are countenanced: 1 (representing truth) and 0 (representing falsity). (ii) Rules are presented which determine a truth value for every proposition of the language, given a model. The most common way of presenting these rules is via truth tables (Figure 1). Another way of stating such rules—which will be useful below—is first to introduce functions on the truth values themselves: a unary function ¬ and four binary functions ∧, ∨, → and ↔ (Figure 2).. (shrink)

In developing the concept of assemblages, Gilles Deleuze draws at least some inspiration from Gilbert Simondon’s concept of information. While his acknowledgement of Simondon’s influence is almost entirely positive, Deleuze explicitly distances himself from the concept of information in order to avoid its link to the field of cybernetics. However, a Deleuzian informational ontology could instead be leveraged as an alternative to cybernetics. Drawing on the Spinozan link between the work of Deleuze and Simondon, it is possible to develop a (...) hybrid informational ontology. This system can not only offer a different approach to information, data and technology than the essentialist concept of information embraced by cybernetics, but also aligns well with recent research in the biological sciences that has disrupted a long-held concept of individuals as entirely separate and autonomous. Shifting away from the Platonic Form to a Deleuzian/simondonian in-formation furthers the post-human project aimed at understanding processes of subjectivation at multiple scales, including the micro and macro. (shrink)

Het Leids-Haags Allegorieënlexicon toont nieuwe perspectieven op de maatschappelijke werkelijkheid met een actuele duiding van vijftig kernthema’s uit de wetenschap. De auteurs zijn de duale promovendi en hun promotores van Leiden University Dual PhD Centre The Hague. Ze worden daarbij geïnspireerd door de metafoor van de grot van Plato: Waar ben ik? Waar sta ik? Welk beeld zie ik? Hoe kan ik dat begrijpen? Er ontstaan beeldende voorstellingen van begrippen waarin op zoek wordt gegaan naar de centrale gedachten die ten (...) grondslag liggen aan die begrippen. Zo wordt de veranderende wereld waargenomen met het besef dat we nooit kunnen weten of we de gehele werkelijkheid kunnen zien of begrijpen. De waarneming is afhankelijk van de zichtpositie die de waarnemer inneemt. Zo ontstaan verbeeldingen van waarnemingen van ons menselijk bestaan. Zoals: assimilatie, creativiteit, gender, kunstenaarschap, magistraat, participatie, regels, tragedie en verzorgingsstaat. Eerst wordt actuele literatuur besproken. Daarna volgt discussie. Tenslotte neemt de auteur positie in. Met bijdragen van promotores Wilfried Admiraal, Ingrid van Biezen, Hans Borgman, Paul Cliteur, Jaap van den Herik, Rikki Holtmaat, Willem Otterspeer, Jos Raadschelders, Robert Tijssen, Wim Willems en promovendi. (shrink)

Rosanna Keefe (`Vagueness by Numbers' MIND 107 1998 565--79) argues that theories of vagueness based upon fuzzy logic and set theory rest on a confusion: once we have assigned a number to an object to represent (for example) its *height*, there is no distinct purpose left to be served by assigning a number to the object to represent its *degree of tallness*; she claims that ``any numbers assigned in an attempt to capture the vagueness of `tall' do no more than (...) serve as another measure of height.'' In this paper I defend fuzzy theories of vagueness against Keefe's attack. I show that the numbers that we assign to objects to measure (for example) heights serve a quite distinct purpose from the numbers that fuzzy theories of vagueness assign to objects to measure degrees of tallness: the two sorts of assignment are both *formally* and *conceptually* distinct; the fuzzy approach to vagueness is well-motivated and free of confusion. (shrink)

There have been two main lines in the literature on restricted games: the first line was started by Myerson (1977) that studied graph-restricted games an the second one was initiated by Faigle (1989). The present paper provides a unified way to look on the literature and establishes connections between the two different lines on restricted games. The strength and advantages of this unified approach becomes clear in the study of the inheritance of the convexity from the game to the restricted (...) game where an interesting result by Nouweland and Borm (1991) on the convexity of graph-restricted games is turned into a direct consequence of the corresponding result by Faigle (1989), by means of this relation. (shrink)

Der Atheismus erlebte in den letzten Jahren eine Renaissance. Durch verschiedene Publikationen wurde der Atheismus in der Offentlichkeit und in den Wissenschaften wieder zum Thema. Religioser Glaube sei mit einem wissenschaftlichen Weltbild nicht vereinbar, so viele Atheisten. Diese Bewegung fasst man unter dem Namen Neuer Atheismus zusammen. Aber ist tatsachlich etwas neu am neuen Atheismus? Gibt es in den modernen Naturwissenschaften noch einen Platz fur Gott? Konnen Argumente der neuen Atheisten uberzeugend zeigen, dass es unvernunftig und unwissenschaftlich ist, an die (...) Existenz eines Gottes zu glauben? Dies sind nur einige Beispielfragen, die die Autoren dieses Bandes versuchen werden zu beantworten. Die Autoren kommen aus unterschiedlichsten Disziplinen: Aus der Physik, der Biologie, der Mathematik, der Philosophie und der Theologie.". (shrink)

The origins of the unrest among the Pannonian legions in A.D. 14 are easily discerned. The great war in Illyricum of A.D. 6–9 involved the legions in a series of extremely arduous campaigns extending across the western half of the Balkan Peninsula, in particular the impenetrable forests of Bosnia and the rugged karst of Dalmatia. The nearness of this area to Italy made the war a great crisis in the reign of Augustus: conquest of Illyricum was the keystone of Augustus' (...) northern frontier policy and no efforts were spared to achieve this. Advances in Germany could be determined from expediency but the subjugation of the Bosnian tribes was a necessity. During the war the need for men was so great that conscription was introduced in Italy and even freedmen were enlisted when ordinary citizen volunteers were not forthcoming. Cassius Dio speaks of the low morale and outbreaks of mutiny in the army of Tiberius during the last season of the war. (shrink)

The development of theories of global cortical dynamics, using linear wave theory, owes much to the pioneering work of Nunez. His work leads to clear predictions on relations of brain size, axonal conduction velocity, and the frequencies of the cerebral rhythms. These predictions do not appear to be fulfilled, but their falsification constrains the range of parameters applicable in further formulations.

Amit's Hebbian model risks being overexplanatory, since it does not depend on specific physiological modelling of cortical ANNs, but concentrates on those phenomena which are modelled by a large class of ANNs. While offering a strong demonstration of the presence of Hebb's “cell assemblies,” it does not offer an equal account of Hebb's “phase sequence” concept.

We outline fresh findings that show that our macroscopic electrocorticographic (ECoG) simulations can account for synchronous multiunit pulse oscillations at separate, simultaneously activated cortical sites and the associated gamma-band ECoG activity. We clarify our views on the approximations of dynamic class applicable to neural events at macroscopic and microscopic scales, and the analogies drawn to classes of ANN behaviour. We accept the need to introduce memory processes and detailed anatomical and physiological information into any future developments of our simulations. On (...) the issue of intrinsic cortical stability and the role of extrinsic fibre systems in maintaining stability, we argue that this position is not in extreme contradiction to those of our commentators, and that the mechanisms implicit in our simulations' properties imply rich computational possibilities. We discuss some of the reasons for and against the existence of significant global resonances in the brain and explain why such behaviour appears absent in our simulations. Last, we discuss other phenomena, such as rhythmic driving of the cortex, which have not yet been introduced into our models, and indicate lines for future development of the simulations. (shrink)

In spite of the seeming heterogeneity of topics in its title - Revolutions, Systems, and Theories - this volume purports to be something more than a random collection of Essays in Political Philosophy. The Colloquium of the Philosophy Department of the University of Western Ontario (29-31 Octo­ ber, 1971) at which initial versions of the first eight papers were delivered was entitled 'Political Theory'; and while the organizers anticipated and indeed welcomed topicality in the issues accorded priority arid in the (...) empirical evidence invoked, they were also hoping for a reasonably comprehensive explorat ion of some of the central issues of political philosophy. For this reason it was quickly decided that in such a field a philosophical focus on clarification of ordering concepts required the suppIement - and test - of researches into more particular subject maUers by social scientists. Thus, to speak in general terms (where the specializatlons and their taxonomies multi­ ply fissiparously!), contributors include political scientists, economists and sociologists (Barnard, Baston, Tullock, Rapoport) as well as philosophers (Scriven, Morgenbesser, Braybrooke, TayIor), and juxtaposed as proponents and commentators ·to generate exchanges across disciplinary frontiers. While the five additional invited papers are alI by professional philosophers, they extend the original Colloquium either by continuing controversy on its funda­ mental issues (e. g., Rubinoff, Nielsen, Roy) or by their continued explorations in what are acknowledged to be boundary areas (e. g., Schick, Wartofsky). The greatest topical emphasis is that on revolution. (shrink)

Le névrosé est un homme qui demeure infantile et s'enferme dans un refuge imaginaire. Sans courage, il est prisonnier des angoisses primitives. A partir d'une compréhension de la relation fondamentale entre l'angoisse et le courage s'éclaire la valeur proprement humaine de l'amour humain, de la rencontre, de la confrontation et de la liaison entre le Moi et le Toi comme une existence sous la forme du Nous - la „liebende Wirheit” dont parle Binswanger. Le mysterium tremendum de l'amour personnel pour (...) un ‘étranger’ - qui n'est donc n i la mère n i le père - est un risque existentiel par essence, c'est le franchissement du seuil vers une forme nouvelle de l'existence du Dasein. C'est la raison pour laquelle la route vers le Toi passe par l'angoisse et que l'engagement dans cette voie présuppose un Moi libre, courageux et responsable. C'est ce que nous apprend déjà le dicton : „Qui veut épouser la fille du roi doit d'abord supporter le tremblement de l'angoisse”. Le courage qui est ici nécessaire s'accomplit dans la liberté heureuse de ce qu'on a appelé le „discours-révélant” -par lequel le „langage-du-désir” de notre inconscience originelle est assumé et qu'il accomplit sa signification. (shrink)

In this comment to Kehrer (2014) the relevance of atheistic argumentation in the domain of ethics as an important part of religion is sketched.

From the point of view of Catholic political theology, this is a massive study of Habermas which attempts to penetrate to the very foundation of Hegelian Marxism and to resolve it by a fundamental theology with a practical intent. Like all “enlighteners,” Habermas’ dilemma is that he is not able to remove people’s need for consolation, for this is what only traditional religious-metaphysical and mystical systems can do. While maintaining that Habermas is a Kantian Marxist or a Marxist Kantian, Siebert (...) nevertheless finds the core of Habermas’ thinking in a translation of Hegelian “spirit” into “communicative structure” or “world.” Yet, unlike Hegel, Habermas seeks redemption and freedom without the cross. This would seem to be questionable in view of Siebert’s thesis that Habermas works in a tradition of mystical atheism, a tradition extending from Meister Eckhart to Hegel to the Frankfurt School. This is the most original and valuable part of a book which otherwise is not remarkable except for the thoroughness of its exposition and its conjunction of Habermas’ communications theory with fundamental theology. (shrink)